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ENFORCING THE CLAWBACK PROVISION:  
PREVENTING THE EVASION OF LIABILITY UNDER 
SECTION 954 OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
Terrance Gallogly
*
 
And even as we seek to revive this economy, it’s also incumbent 
on us to rebuild it stronger than before.  We don’t want an econ-
omy that has the same weaknesses that led to this crisis.  And that 
means addressing some of the underlying problems that led to 
this turmoil and devastation in the first place. Now, one of the 
most significant contributors to this recession was a financial crisis 
as dire as any we’ve known in generations—at least since the ‘30s.  
And that crisis was born of a failure of responsibility—from Wall 
Street all the way to Washington—that brought down many of the 
world’s largest financial firms and nearly dragged our economy 
into a second Great Depression.
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2008, the world financial system was sent into the 
worst crisis since the Great Depression.
2
  As major financial institu-
tions faced liquidity problems and stock prices dropped severely, the 
crisis began to have widespread economic repercussions in the Unit-
ed States and around the world.
3
  With mounting fears that the Unit-
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 1 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform at 
Cooper Union, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-wall-street-reform. 
 2 John Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, with No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 18, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169431617549947.html.  
The U.S. financial system resembles a patient in intensive care. The 
body is trying to fight off a disease that is spreading, and as it does so, 
the body convulses, settles for a time and then convulses again. The ill-
ness seems to be overwhelming the self-healing tendencies of markets. 
The doctors in charge are resorting to ever-more invasive treatment, 
and are now experimenting with remedies that have never before been 
applied.  
Id. 
 3 See Timeline: Global Economy in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18709/timeline.html (follow “Meltdown (2007-
GALLOGLY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  5:41 PM 
1230 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1229 
 
ed States was facing the possibility of a depression, the federal gov-
ernment took drastic steps aimed at preventing further economic de-
cline with the passing of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) 
legislation and the Federal Stimulus Bill.
4
   
In response to the financial crisis and what Congress perceived 
as its root causes, the Obama Administration pushed for the passage 
of a financial regulatory overhaul bill.
5
  Congress approved the finan-
cial reform bill known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) in July 2010.
6
  The fi-
nancial reform bill was aimed at preventing the practices and events 
that led to the 2008 crisis.
7
  Within the Dodd-Frank Act were a num-
ber of provisions that created new regulations for executive compen-
sation, including what is known as the clawback provision.
8
  The 
clawback provision requires publicly held companies to recover com-
 
Present)” hyperlink; then follow hyperlinks in the timeline for the fall of 2008) (last 
modified Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Timeline].   
In fall 2008 the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged dramatically, 
banks became unwilling or unable to lend to one another, and the 
once highly liquid and low-risk commercial paper market evaporated. 
This was followed by massive government bailouts of commercial 
banks, investment banks, and other financial institutions that on a 
worldwide basis exceeded $2 trillion. 
JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (6th ed. 2009).    
 4 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Adam Nagourney, Partisan Fight Endures as Stimulus 
Bill Signed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 20099, at A17; Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic 
Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122304922742602533.html?KEYWORDS=troubled+
asset+relief+program.  
 5 Matt Spetalnick, Obama Pushes Wall Street Reform with Populism, REUTERS  (May 
15, 2010, 6:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/15/us-financial-
regulation-obama-idUSTRE64B50I20100515 (quoting President Obama as saying 
that “[w]e’ll make our financial system more transparent by bringing the kinds of 
complex, back room deals that helped trigger this crisis into the light of day [and 
w]e’ll prevent banks from taking on so much risk that they could collapse and 
threaten our whole economy”).  
 6 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Binyamin Appelbaum & Da-
vid M. Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift on Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES (July 
15, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16regulate.html?adxnnl=1&ref=fin
ancial_regulatory_reform&adxnnlx=1284934684-Ea8YFikIeLLs0O5a4h+3Cw. 
 7 See Appelbaum & Herzenhom, supra note 6.  “That era of hands-off optimism 
was gaveled to an end on Thursday as the Senate gave final approval to a bill that re-
asserts the importance of federal supervision of financial transactions.” Id.  
 8 Joseph Alley, Jr. et al., Executive Compensation and Governance Provisions of the 
Dodd Frank Act, BUS. ETHICS (July 22, 2010), http://business-
ethics.com/2010/07/22/1640-executive-compensation-and-corporate-governance-
provisions-of-the-dodd-frank-act/. 
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pensation from their executive officers under certain circumstances.
9
  
The inclusion of the clawback provision in the Dodd-Frank Act re-
flects the earlier inclusion of another clawback provision in the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002.
10
  Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
response to a wave of corporate scandal and corruption.
11
  Based on 
the similarities and the differences in the two provisions, the inter-
pretation, implementation, and enforcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
provision may have important implications for the future of the 
Dodd-Frank provision. 
While the clawback provision of the Dodd-Frank Act aimed to 
help avoid a repeat of the financial crisis, its effectiveness may de-
pend on the how it is interpreted, implemented, and enforced.  This 
is especially relevant in regard to whether executive officers are able 
to escape personal liability for money owed.  The uncertainty sur-
rounding the clawback provision of the Dodd-Frank Act raises a 
number of interesting and important legal issues.  Part II of this 
Comment will examine the global financial crisis, including the con-
tributing factors, the American public’s reaction, and the federal 
government’s response.  Part III will review the two relevant clawback 
provisions—one found in the Dodd-Frank Act and the other in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  It will examine the requirements of each provi-
sion, the differences and similarities of the provisions, and the inter-
actions between the provisions.  Part IV will analyze the steps that ex-
ecutive officers may take to try to avoid liability for money owed 
under the Dodd-Frank provision, including indemnification, director 
and officer insurance, and personal bankruptcy.  It will examine the 
manner in which courts might prevent executive officers from using 
these methods to avoid liability.  Part V will explain why courts should 
prevent executive officers from escaping liability under the Dodd-
Frank provision by using these various methods.  Such rulings will ef-
fectuate Congress’s policies behind implementing the Dodd-Frank 
Act.  Specifically, the author will argue that the interpretation, im-
plementation, and enforcement of the clawback provision of the 
Dodd-Frank Act may have significant effects on how companies oper-
ate and how executive officers behave going forward.  These issues 
 
 9  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat. 
at 1904; see also Alley, Jr. et al., supra note 8.   
 10 See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006); see also Rachael 
E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep 
the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (2008).  
 11 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1.  
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surrounding the clawback provision are so important because of their 
potential economic impact. 
II. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE CAUSES, THE PUBLIC OUTCRY, 
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
Often referred to as “The Great Recession,”
12
 the financial crisis, 
and the economic downturn that followed, have their origins in a 
number of different places.
13
  Dating back to 2007, a combination of 
economic and financial factors came together and pushed the world 
economy to the brink of disaster.
14
  While there has been no consen-
sus as to the exact causes of the crisis,
15
 most experts agree that cer-
tain factors played a role in triggering the crisis, including the mort-
gage bubble, excessive leverage, and deregulation of the financial 
industry.
16
  The presence of incentives for risk-taking by management 
at financial institutions is often cited as one of the factors that played 
an important role in the crisis.
17
  The compensation structure for ex-
ecutives and managers incentivized risk-taking by placing a large 
amount of their pay in performance based bonuses.
18
  This compen-
sation structure encouraged executives and managers to take high 
risks because the structure rewarded short-term success.  As a result, 
executives were tempted to pursue short-term gains, even where the 
action could hurt the company’s long term stability and health.
19
  As 
 
 12 Courtney Schlisserman, “Great Recession” Gets Recognition as Entry in AP Stylebook, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ayojB2KWQG4k. 
 13 See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40173, CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 1 (Apr. 9, 2009). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Even the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission did not provide a completely de-
finitive analysis of the reasons for the financial crisis even though  it produced three 
separate reports.  M.V., The Financial-Crisis Commission Fails to Solve the Whodunit, 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 27, 2011, 4:03 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/01/americas_financial-
crisis_commission (noting that the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was unable 
reach a consensus on the causes of the financial crisis and stating that “the result is 
an unfortunate loss of credibility and, confusingly, three competing narratives”).       
 16 JINKLING, supra note 13, at 5–8.   
 17 Id. at 6.  
 18 Id.  
 19 Jian Cai et al., Compensation and Risk Incentives in Banking and Finance, FED. 
RESERVE BANK CLEV. (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-13.cfm 
(“[C]ompensation structures that heavily reward short-term performance (for exam-
ple, through bonuses) may encourage managers to take opportunities that would 
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part of its final report, the majority of the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission concluded that the compensation systems and the in-
centives that the compensation structures  created played a role in 
the financial crisis.
20
  These systems encouraged going after the big 
bet, without properly considering the long term consequences.
21
  Of-
ten, the “big bets” involved a large amount of leveraging by the finan-
cial institutions, which left them “vulnerable to financial distress or 
ruin if the value of their investments declined even modestly.”
22
  
The collapse of the financial giant Lehman Brothers is one of 
the most prominent examples of the results that excessive risk-taking 
can have on a company’s stability and the economy in general.
23
  Ex-
 
boost immediate profitability but risk future financial health.”).  As early as 2005, 
there were warnings about the perverse incentives that the compensation structures 
of investment managers created. See Raghuram Rajan, Has Financial Development Made 
the World Riskier? 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11728, 
2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11728.pdf?new_window=1.  The 
perverse incentives were thought to have the potential to create the conditions for a 
major crisis in the financial system.  Id.   
 20 FIN. CRISIS COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT at xvii–xix, available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.  The interna-
tional community also recognized the role that compensation and its incentives 
played in the global financial crisis, with the leaders of the G20 stating that strong 
international standards for compensation must be implemented to reduce excessive 
risk-taking.  LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT para. 17 (2009), available 
at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm.  
 21 FIN. CRISIS COMM’N, note 20, at xix.  
 22 Id. 
 23 See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hear-
ing Before the H. Financial Serv. Comm., 111th Cong. 179 (2010) (prepared statement of 
Mary Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (stating that the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers reflected larger problems in the financial system, including incen-
tives for excess risk-taking and insufficient risk management).  Between 2000 and 
2008, the top executives at Lehman Brothers received an estimated $1 billion from 
cash bonuses and equity sales.  Lucian Bebchuk, et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257 
(2010).  During the same period, the top executives at Bear Stearns received over 
$1.4 billion from cash bonuses and equity shares.  Id.  The near collapse and emer-
gency sale of Bear Stearns is another example of consequences of excessive risk-
taking by financial institutions.  Yalman Onaran, JPMorgan Surges After Striking Deal for 
Bear Stearns, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2008, 4:02 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aK2pw3mrmCUQ.  
“[The] fire-sale to JPMorgan cap[ped] an eight-month slide in the company’s for-
tunes that began [in] July [2007] with the collapse of two of its hedge funds, which 
invested in securities linked to subprime mortgages.”  Id.  With the signs of the com-
ing financial crisis mounting in 2007, the seven largest Wall Street firms paid $122 
billion in total compensation and benefits, even as their net revenues fell.  Tomoeh 
Murakami & Renae Merle, The Bonuses Keep Coming, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at D1.  
These firms included Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase, Merrill 
Lynch, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, and Citigroup.  Id.  These pay packages came 
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ecutives at Lehman Brothers undertook risk-taking activities, such as 
investing in subprime mortgages and mortgage backed securities, 
which eventually helped lead to the company’s collapse in the fall of 
2008.
24
  Management’s excessive risk-taking in the major financial in-
stitutions and large corporations was indicative of a larger, systemic 
risk-taking, which was allowed to occur primarily due to deregulation 
of the financial industry.
25
  This systemic risk-taking was one of the 
major factors that plunged the global economy into crisis.
26
 
The deregulation of the financial industry occurred over the 
past few decades, as the federal government relied on the self-
regulation of the market rather than on government oversight and 
enforcement.
27
  For example, in 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
28
  The 
Glass-Steagall Act had restricted the co-ownership of commercial 
banks, which undertake everyday banking activity, and investment 
banks, which underwrite securities.
29
  At the time of the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act, many lawmakers and officials believed that it would 
 
in a year during which the firms reported $55 billion in mortgage-related losses and 
shareholders suffered $200 billion in lost value.  Id.     
 24 Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing 
Before the H. Financial Serv. Comm., 111th Cong. 181 (2010) (prepared statement of 
Mary Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).  
 25 JICKLING, supra note 13, at 6.  The collapse of Washington Mutual in 2008 is a 
strong example of the risk-taking by financial institutions and the lack of regulation 
by government authorities.  See Floyd Norris, Eyes Open, WaMu Collapsed Just the Same, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/25norris.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=wa
mu&st=cse#.  Prior to the 2008 crisis, top executives at Washington Mutual forecast-
ed the coming problems with the housing market.  Id.  Despite recognizing the high 
risk involved in the housing market, the bank continued to take on large amounts of 
bad mortgage loans.  Id.  Regulators, specifically the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
were made aware of the problems at Washington Mutual but failed to take any signif-
icant action in response.  Id.  In the end, Washington Mutual collapsed and became 
one of the largest bank failures in American history.  Id.    
 26 JICKLING, supra note 13, at 6. 
 27 See Timeline, supra note 3 (follow “Regulation & Deregulation (1880-Present)” 
hyperlink; then follow hyperlinks in timeline from 1990 to 2010); Anthony Faiola et 
al., What Went Wrong, WASH. POST (Oct.15, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008101403343.html?sid=ST2008101403344.  
 28 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006); see also Cyrus Sanati, 10 Years Later, Looking at the 
Repeal of Glass-Steagall, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2009, 3:45 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/10-years-later-looking-at-repeal-of-glass-
steagall/.  
 29 Sanati, supra note 28.  
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allow American financial institutions to compete against foreign insti-
tutions in a globalized economy by removing what they perceived as 
antiquated Depression-era restrictions that were holding back the 
U.S. financial system.
30
  Ten years after the repeal, many experts be-
lieve that the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed to the financial cri-
sis of 2008 because “the huge banks born out of the revocation of 
Glass-Steagall, especially Citigroup, and the insurance companies that 
were allowed to deal in securities, like the American International 
Group, would not have run into trouble had the law still been in 
place.”
31
 
The American public responded to the imprudent and risky be-
havior of the financial industry with anger and disapproval.  Accord-
ing to a Pew Research Center report from 2010, a large majority of 
Americans have a negative view of financial institutions and banks, 
with only twenty-two percent of Americans saying that they view these 
institutions positively.
32
  The actions of the large financial institutions 
created a feeling of disconnection between “Main Street” and “Wall 
Street” within the American public.  This perception of “Wall Street” 
culture is fueled by the fact that companies handed out billions of 
dollars in bonuses, while the rest of the country was facing high un-
employment and tough economic choices.
33
  In fact, a report from 
 
 30 Stephen Labaton, Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Bill Easing Banking Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at A1.  Interestingly, the lawmakers who opposed the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act predicted “that the deregulation of Wall Street would someday 
wreak havoc on the nation’s financial system.”  Id. 
 31 Sanati, supra note 28.  The financial crisis of 2008 has been viewed as a vindica-
tion of those lawmakers and experts who opposed the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 
and predicted that it would cause financial disaster.  Sam Stein, Glass-Steagall Act: The 
Senators and Economists Who Got It Right, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2009, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/11/glass-steagall-act-the-
se_n_201557.html.    
 32 Distrust, Discontent, Anger, and Partisan Rancor: Overview, PEW RES. CTR. FOR 
PEOPLE & PRESS (Apr. 18, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/606/trust-in-
government.  The Pew Center research found that twenty-two percent of those sur-
veyed believe that banks and other financial institutions have a positive effect on the 
way things are going in the country.  Id.  In the same survey, seventy-one percent of 
respondents believed that small businesses have a positive effect on the country.  Id.; 
see also 47%—Public Shows Wariness about Wall Street, PEW RES. CTR. THE DATABANK, 
http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1345 (last visited Apr. 
21, 2012).  A May 2011 survey found that forty-seven percent of respondents believe 
that Wall Street hurts the U.S. economy more than it helps.  Id.   
 33 Frank Ahrens, Admiration Turns to Anger as Wall St. Bosses Feather Nests, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 31, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/30/AR2009013003665.html.  As the profits of finan-
cial institutions have returned, so have the compensation packages for the institu-
tions’ top executives.  See Eric Dash & Susanne Craig, Big Paydays Return with Big Prof-
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the New York comptroller stated that Wall Street firms gave out $18.4 
billion in bonuses for 2008, despite the fact that it was “one of the 
worst years ever on the Street.”
34
  The backlash against bonuses was 
compounded by the wide-spread perception that the taxpayers are 
funding them through federal bailout funds.
35
 
Early in its term, the Obama Administration responded to the 
outrage of the American public and put forward its proposal for an 
overhaul of the financial regulatory system.
36
  The wide-ranging pro-
posal was the most sweeping overhaul since the reforms enacted in 
 
its at Wall St. Banks, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2011, 9:11 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/big-paydays-return-with-big-profits-at-
wall-st-banks/?partner=rss&emc=rss.   Similarly, another writer remarks,  
So far, this recovery has not trickled down. After two relatively lean 
years, C.E.O.’s in finance, technology, energy and beyond are pulling 
down multimillion-dollar paychecks. What many of these executives 
aren’t doing, however, is hiring. Unemployment, although down from 
its peak, stood at 8.8 percent in March. And few economists predict the 
jobless rate will drop substantially anytime soon. 
Daniel Costello, The Drought is over (At Least for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at 
BU1.  In 2010, the three highest-paid CEO’s earned $84.5 million, $76.1 million, and 
$70.1 million, respectively.  Id.  The compensation packages were not as lucrative in 
2011, with Wall Street’s bonuses falling twenty-five percent from the previous year.  
John Gralla, Wall Street Bonuses Fell 25 Percent in 2011, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2012, 4:15 
PM),  http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-wallstreet-bonuses-
idUSTRE8241FJ20120306.   
 34 Ahrens, supra note 33.  In 2008 alone, Merrill Lynch paid out $209 million in 
bonuses to ten of its highest-paid executives despite suffering a net loss of $27.6 bil-
lion.  Merrill’s Top Earners Took $209 Million in 2009, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 4, 2009, 7:19 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/04/merrills-top-earners-took-209-million-in-
2008-report-says/.  In response to the outrage over bonuses, Congress included with-
in the Federal Stimulus Bill a number of limitations on bonuses for executives at fi-
nancial institutions that had received government assistance.  Tomoeh Murakami 
Tse, Congress Trumps Obama by Cuffing Bonuses on CEOs, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021303288.html?sid=ST2009021302017.   
 35 See Ahrens, supra note 33.  As President Obama remarked,  
Now, Americans don’t begrudge anybody for success when that success 
is earned.  But when we read in the past, and sometimes in the present, 
about enormous executive bonuses at firms—even as they’re relying on 
assistance from taxpayers or they’re taking huge risks that threaten the 
system as a whole or their company is doing badly—it offends our fun-
damental values. 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform at Cooper 
Union, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-wall-street-reform. 
 36 Helene Cooper, Obama Pushes Financial Regulatory Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 
21, 2009, at A20.  
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response to the Great Depression.
37
  As the Administration pushed for 
the passage of the financial reform bill, President Obama expressed 
his anger with the behavior of the financial industry and attempted to 
appeal to the American public’s frustration and anger.
38
  After two 
years of debate, Congress finally approved the financial reform bill, 
and President Obama signed it into law in July of 2010.
39
  Known as 
the Dodd-Frank Act, the legislation is aimed at preventing another 
major financial crisis by regulating the behaviors, instruments, and 
practices that are seen as having facilitated the collapse.
40
  Many pro-
ponents of the legislation argued that the overhaul was long overdue 
as the regulatory system had failed to keep pace with the innovations 
and changes in the financial markets.
41
 
The Dodd-Frank Act covers a wide range of areas within the fi-
nancial industry, with provisions that regulate credit cards, consumer 
protection, mortgages, credit rating agencies, and derivatives.
42
  With-
in the Dodd-Frank Act, there are numerous provisions that created 
new regulations for executive compensation, including a “Say on Pay” 
provision, a “Compensation Committees” provision, and an “Execu-
tive Compensation Disclosure” provision.
43
  These provisions are part 
of a larger objective to strengthen corporate governance in order to 
 
 37 Obama’s Financial Reform Plan: The Condensed Version, WALL ST. J. WASH. WIRE 
(June 17, 2009, 2:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/06/17/obamas-
financial-reform-plan-the-condensed-version/.         
 38 See Jeff Zeleny, As the Public Simmers, Obama Lets Off Steam, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2009, at A9. 
 39 Appelbaum & Herszenhorn, supra note 6. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See also Jill Jackson, Wall Street Reform: A Summary of What’s in the Bill, CBS NEWS 
(June 25, 2010, 11:48 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008835-
503544.html. 
 43 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 951–57, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1889–1907 (2010) (to be codified at in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see 
also Alley Jr. et al., supra note 8 (describing the provisions and labeling them by their 
commonly used nicknames).  For example, in 2011, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) proposed rules under Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  SEC 
Proposes Rules on Disclosure of Incentive-Based Compensation at Financial Institution, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-57.htm.  Section 956 calls for federal regula-
tors to require “covered financial institutions” to disclose information on the struc-
ture of the institutions’ incentive-based compensation arrangements and to prohibit 
compensation arrangements that regulators determine encourage excessive risk.  
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 956.   
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avoid the oversight issues that occurred prior to the crisis.
44
  The in-
tent behind the provisions is to provide shareholders with better 
oversight and more involvement in the regulation and formation of a 
company’s executive compensation.
45
  As part of the new regulations 
on executive compensation, Congress included a provision entitled 
“Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation.”
46
  This provision 
is Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act
47
 and it is most commonly re-
ferred to as the clawback provision.
48
  This provision mandates that 
publicly traded companies institute policies that would require exec-
utive officers to return compensation in certain situations.
49
  Congress 
enacted this provision to discourage executives from making high-risk 
decisions that would have short-term gains but eventually hurt the 
stability and strength of the company. 
50
  Congress anticipated that 
this would deter executives from making these high-risk decisions be-
cause, in the end, the executives could be forced to return a part of 
their compensation.
51
  Congress also determined that it would be un-
fair to shareholders if executives were allowed to keep compensation 
that they had been rewarded erroneously.
52
  The following parts will 
examine Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act provision and the legal 
issues surrounding its implementation and enforcement. 
III. THE CLAWBACK PROVISION OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
A. Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 954 falls under “Subtitle E—
Accountability and Executive Compensation,” and it places new regu-
lations on the governance of executive compensation within compa-
 
 44 THE INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, U.S. REGULATORY REFORM: THE INVESTOR’S 
PERSPECTIVE, at 22 (2009), available at 
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/investment%20issues/Invest
ors%27%20Working%20Group%20Report%20%28July%202009%29.pdf.   
 45 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133–36 (2010). 
 46 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat. 
at 1904.  
 47 Id.  
 48 Alley, Jr. et al., supra note 8. 
 49 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat. 
at 1904; see also Alley, Jr. et al., supra note 8.  
 50 THE INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, supra note 44, at 23. 
 51 See id.  
 52 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136. 
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nies.
53
  Section 954 amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by 
adding Section 10D.
54
  Under Section 954, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) is required to put in place rules that re-
quire any company that is listed on a national securities exchange to 
develop and implement a policy providing 
for disclosure of the policy of the issuer on incentive-based com-
pensation that is based on financial information required to be 
reported under the securities laws; and 
that, in the event that the issuer is required to prepare an ac-
counting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the 
issuer with any financial reporting requirement under the securi-
ties laws, the issuer will recover from any current or former execu-
tive officer of the issuer who received incentive-based compensa-
tion (including stock options awarded as compensation) during 
the 3-year period preceding the date on which the issuer is re-
quired to prepare an accounting restatement, based on the erro-
neous data, in excess of what would have been paid to the execu-
tive officer under the accounting restatement.
55
 
Section 954 thus requires the SEC to put the burden on the compa-
nies listed on national securities exchanges to create and enforce 
clawback policies.
56
  These policies would require companies to re-
cover portions of incentive-based compensation from executive offic-
ers; incentive-based pay includes not only bonuses but also stock op-
tions that were given as compensation.
57
  The clawback policy will 
come into play when a company is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement as a result of the company’s material noncompliance 
with any financial reporting requirements under securities laws.
58
  In 
that event, the company is required to recover the portion of the in-
centive-based pay that is in excess of what the executive would have 
been paid under the accounting restatement.
59
  This requirement co-
vers the incentive-based pay that was rewarded during the three-year 
period prior to the date when the accounting restatement was re-
quired.
60
  Section 954 also requires that the SEC create rules that or-
 
 53 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat. 
at 1904. 
 54 Id.  
 55 Id.  
 56 See id.  
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id.  
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der the national securities exchanges to prohibit the listing of any 
company that does not develop and implement a proper clawback 
policy.
61
 
With the language that is in place, Congress has delegated power 
to the SEC to fill in the specifics of the rules that will govern the 
clawback policy.
62
  The SEC has yet to promulgate these rules but it is 
expected to have them in place by June of 2012.
63
  There are a num-
ber of questions left open for the SEC to answer when writing these 
rules.  On what date does the triggering event of a restatement occur 
so that the three-year period can be calculated?  Who is considered 
an executive officer?  What must a company do to “implement” the 
clawback policy?  How does a company “recover” the “excess” com-
pensation?  And how is the “excess” compensation calculated?
64
  The-
se are all important questions that the SEC must consider when it is 
promulgating the new rules pursuant to Section 954.  As of the writ-
ing of this Comment, the SEC had not proposed rules pursuant to 
Section 954.  While the rules will most likely address important unre-
solved issues, their implementation is not likely to affect the analysis 
in this Comment because the rules are not likely to address the issues 
discussed in this Comment.  
B. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
In order to better understand Section 954 and the provision’s 
future implementation, it may be helpful to examine the clawback 
provision enacted and enforced prior to the Dodd-Frank Act.  In the 
aftermath of high-profile corporate scandals, which resulted in the 
 
 61 Id. § 954. 
 62 Deborah Lifshey, et al., Summary of Clawback Policies Under Dodd-Frank Reform 
Act, BOARDMEMBER.COM (July 23, 2010), 
https://www.boardmember.com/Print.aspx?id=5146.   
 63 Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-
upcoming.shtml#08-12-11 (last modified Apr. 18, 2012).  The SEC stated that it 
planned to propose and adopt rules pursuant to Section 954 sometime between Jan-
uary and June of 2012.  Id.  Originally, the SEC stated that the rules for Section 954 
would be proposed and adopted by the end of 2011.  SEC Delays Implementation of 
Dodd-Frank Executive Compensation Requirements, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON 
LLP (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.cgsh.com/sec_delays_planned_implementation_for_dodd-
frank_executive_compensation_requirements/.        
 64 William R. Baker III et al., A Tale of Two Clawbacks: The Compensation Consequenc-
es of Misstated Financials, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=FirmPublicationDetail&office=2&publicati
on=3662. 
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collapse of major corporations, Congress responded by enacting the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
65
  These scandals involved companies 
such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Global Crossing.
66
  The amount 
of corporate fraud and corruption was shocking to many Americans 
and resulted in a loss of investor confidence in the system.
67
  The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act was aimed at improving accountability, integrity, and 
transparency in the accounting and financial practices of major cor-
porations.
68
  The objective was for investors to have more accurate 
knowledge when considering whether to invest in a corporation and 
to make investors more confident that their investments would be 
safe from fraud and corruption.
69
  The overarching goal behind the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was to prevent the wide-ranging negative conse-
quences that followed corporate scandals.
70
 
Within Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress includ-
ed a clawback provision.
71
  Under Section 304, in the event that an is-
suer of stock is required to prepare an accounting restatement as a 
result of misconduct, the CEO and CFO of the issuer are to reim-
burse the issuer for 
any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation 
received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month pe-
riod following the first public issuance or filing with the Commis-
sion (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embody-
ing such financial reporting requirement; and 
 
 65 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 4. 
 66 Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Du-
ties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2004).   
Sarbanes-Oxley would not have been enacted if Enron had been an iso-
lated event. Enron’s bankruptcy was soon followed by the financial col-
lapse of approximately a dozen large public companies where there 
was also strong evidence of reporting violations and audit failures even 
more egregious than that which occurred in Enron.   
COX ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.      
 67 See Johnson & Sides, supra note 66, at 1153.   
 68 J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of Restoring 
Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 343 (2005).  
 69 See Allison List, Note, The Lax Enforcement of Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley: Why is 
the SEC Ignoring Its Greatest Asset in the Fight Against Corporate Misconduct?, 70 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 195, 197–98 (2009).  
 70 See id. at 198 (“The concern became that investors had lost confidence in the 
market and would pull their money out of the market, leading to an economic down-
turn if something was not done to fix the problem.”). 
 71 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).  
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any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during 
that 12-month period.
72
 
Because of the similarities between this provision and Section 954 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, it may be instructive to compare the two provi-
sions and consider how they interact with each other. 
C. The Interaction Between Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The provision set forth in Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
expands on the provision set forth in Section 304 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  The two clawback provisions co-exist, as Section 954 does 
not preempt or replace Section 304.
73
  While the provisions comple-
ment each other, they overlap in many ways.
74
  Specifically, the two 
provisions call for very similar actions in very similar situations.  Both 
provisions call for executive compensation to be returned to the 
company in circumstances in which the company is required to pre-
pare an accounting restatement because of material noncompliance 
with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws.
75
  
The general aim of both provisions is similar—they both attempt to 
discourage certain types of behavior by executive officers.
76
  Section 
954 is intended to discourage excessive risk-taking by executive offic-
ers, while Section 304 is intended to improve corporate management 
to discourage fraudulent or wrongful conduct by executive officers.
77
 
While the overall requirements of the provisions are similar, 
there are a number of important differences between them.  One of 
the most important differences is that Section 304 is only triggered 
when the accounting restatement resulted from misconduct, while 
Section 954 does not require any such misconduct.
78
  Another im-
portant difference is that Section 304 covers only the CFOs and CEOs 
of a company, while Section 954 applies to all current and former 
“executive officers.”
79
  Also, Section 304 requires repayment of all in-
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Baker III et al., supra note 64. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136 (2010); see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 8. 
 77 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136; see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 8. 
 78 Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4), 
with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006); see also Baker III et 
al., supra note 64. 
 79 Supra note 78; see also Baker III et al., supra note 64.  
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centive-based and equity-based compensation, along with all stock 
profits, while Section 954 only requires the repayment of incentive-
based compensation, including stock options awarded as compensa-
tion, that are in excess of what should have been granted.
80
  Finally, 
Section 304 covers compensation received in the year following the 
issuance of a misstated financial statement, while Section 954 covers 
compensation received in the three years before the date on which 
the company was required to file the restatement.
81
  The overall effect 
of these differences is that Section 304 is a narrower provision than 
Section 954, because it applies in fewer circumstances than Section 
954.  The wider scope of Section 954 may make it more effective than 
Section 304. 
D. Enforcement of Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Implications for the Future Enforcement of Section 954 of the Dodd-
Frank Act 
Due to the similarities between the clawback provisions of both 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the manner in 
which the clawback provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been in-
terpreted, implemented, and enforced may have significant implica-
tions for the clawback provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Based on the 
language of the clawback provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, courts 
have held that only the SEC can bring an action against a company 
under Section 304.
82
  This means that the provision does not create a 
private right of action under which individuals can bring suit against 
a company.
83
  The courts have reasoned, based on the plain language 
of the text and the legislative intent, that there is no private right of 
action because the statute does not expressly or implicitly create 
one.
84
  For example, the Ninth Circuit in In re Digimarc Corp. held that 
“Section 304 does not explicitly create a private right of action be-
cause nothing the text of the section makes any mention of a cause of 
 
 80 See Baker III et al., supra note 64. 
 81 Id.  
 82 See In re Digimarc Corp., 549 F.3d 1223, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008); In re iBasis, Inc. 
Deriv. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223 (D. Mass. 2007); In re BISYS Grp. Inc., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (E.D. Pa. 
2005). 
 83 See In re Digimarc, 549 F.3d at 1230–31; In re iBasis, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 224; In re 
BISYS, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 464; Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 652–58.     
 84 See In re Digimarc, 549 F.3d at 1230–31; In re iBasis, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 224; In re 
BISYS, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 464; Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 652–58.     
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action.”85  The court also held that Section 304 does not implicitly 
create a private right of action “[b]ecause the text and the structure 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not demonstrate an intent to create a 
private right of action under [S]ection 304.”86 
Since there is no private right of action under Section 304, the 
enforcement of the provision falls solely on the SEC.
87
  For the first 
seven years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC did not exercise its 
power under Section 304 very frequently.
88
  This trend has changed 
recently as the SEC has stepped up its enforcement of Section 304 
and brought actions against company executives.
89
  According to the 
SEC Director of Enforcement, Robert Khuzami, the SEC took action 
against fourteen executive officers in eleven cases from 2008 to 
2010.
90
  The most prominent case of SEC enforcement of Section 304 
is SEC v. Jenkins.
91
  There, the SEC brought an independent action 
based on its power under Section 304 against the CEO of an auto-
parts company.
92
  The SEC sought reimbursement of four million dol-
lars in incentive-based pay and profits made from the sale of stock.
93
  
The action was based on accounting restatements made by the com-
pany due to “pervasive accounting fraud.”
94
  The defendant chal-
lenged the action, arguing that Section 304 did not apply because the 
SEC had not alleged misconduct on the defendant’s part.
95
  The 
court disagreed and held that Section 304 allows the SEC to seek re-
imbursement of executive compensation even when the defendant is 
 
 85  In re Digimarc, 549 F.3d at 1230.  
 86 Id. at 1233.  
 87 See Baker III et al., supra note 64. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Thomas P. Cimino, Jr. et al., SEC Uses Section 304 to Claw Back Incentive-Based 
Compensation from “Innocent” Executives—SEC v. O’Dell & SEC v. Jenkins, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Sept. 9., 2010), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-uses-section-304-to-
claw-back-incentive-based-compensation-innocent-executives.  The SEC settled a suit 
against the CEO of Beazer Homes for $6.5 million in March 2011, which was brought 
under Section 304.  SEC Obtains Settlement with CEO to Recover Compensation and Stock 
Profits He Received During Company’s Fraud, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-61.htm.      
 90 Richard Khuzami, Director, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech to the Society 
of American Business Editors and Writers (Mar. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch031910rsk.htm. 
 91 See Cimino, Jr. et al., supra note 89.  
 92 SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072–73 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 93 Id. at 1073. 
 94 Cimino, Jr. et al., supra note 89.  
 95 Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.  
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not alleged to have committed misconduct.
96
  The court also held 
that only misconduct by the company is required for an action under 
Section 304.
97
  By allowing the SEC to bring an action against an ex-
ecutive who has not been accused of misconduct, this case permits 
the SEC to pursue action against a larger group of executives.
98
  It 
remains to be seen if the SEC will take advantage of this power. 
The enforcement under Section 304 may have important impli-
cations for the future enforcement of Section 954, as the SEC and the 
courts may treat Section 954 and Section 304 in a similar manner.  
First, the SEC will most likely be able to bring action against an exec-
utive whose company is required to prepare an accounting restate-
ment because otherwise there would be no way to enforce the provi-
sion in case that companies fail to enforce their clawback policies on 
their own. While a non-compliant company may be delisted from the 
national securities exchanges, this will not help with reimbursement 
of the compensation that was erroneously awarded.
99
  Second, the 
SEC will most likely be aggressive in its enforcement of Section 954, 
as the SEC considers clawback provisions to be an important tool in 
its enforcement of corporate governance.
100
  This eagerness to exer-
cise the power of clawback provisions is evidenced in the recent in-
crease in suits that the SEC has brought under Section 304.
101
  Third, 
courts will have to determine whether there is a private right of ac-
tion under Section 954 that would allow individuals to bring suits 
against companies that are not in compliance.  Based on the In re 
Digimarc Corp. court’s analysis, the court will only find a private right 
of action if it was expressly or implicitly granted by the statute.
102
  Alt-
hough Section 954 does not explicitly provide for a private cause of 
action, courts may find that the language implicitly grants a private 
right of action by requiring that companies “implement” the claw-
 
 96 Id. at 1074. 
 97 Id. at 1074–75.  
 98 See id.  For example, the SEC brought a “clawback” suit against the CEO of 
Beazer Homes, even though he was not personally charged with misconduct.  SEC 
Obtains Settlement with CEO to Recover Compensation and Stock Profits He Received During 
Company’s Fraud, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-61.htm.  Despite not being implicated 
in the fraud that took place at Beazer, Ian J. McCarthy agreed to reimburse the com-
pany for his compensation in 2006, totaling around $6.5 million.  Id.         
 99 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4). 
 100 See Khuzami, supra note 90.  
 101 See id. 
 102 549 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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back policy.
103
  This language seems to imply that the enforcement of 
the provision rests on the companies.
104
  If the courts do hold that 
there is a private right of action, this could give shareholders an im-
portant new weapon and could result in shareholder derivative suits 
to enforce companies’ clawback policies.
105
  A number of factors will 
influence the future enforcement of Section 954, which remains an 
open question.  
IV. POSSIBLE METHODS OF ESCAPING LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 954 
The effectiveness of future enforcement of Section 954 may face 
another possible challenge, in addition to the issues involved in how 
the provision is enforced in the future.  Executive officers may at-
tempt to escape liability for money owed under Section 954 by em-
ploying a number of different tactics.  The means by which executive 
officers may try to avoid liability could include indemnification, direc-
tor and officer insurance, and personal bankruptcy.  All three of the-
se methods could present executive officers, who were ordered to re-
turn compensation to their companies, with the opportunity to 
circumvent the personal liability that Section 954 imposes.  If execu-
tive officers are allowed to use these methods to avoid liability, the ef-
fectiveness of Section 954 will be significantly reduced. 
A. Indemnification 
Indemnification is one of the most reliable corporate protec-
tions afforded to directors and officers.
106
  Indemnification is the 
method by which a corporation agrees to “reimburse any agent, em-
ployee, officer, or director for reasonable expenses for losses of any 
sort arising from any actual or threatened judicial proceeding or in-
vestigation.”
107
  Most states have indemnification provisions within 
their corporate statutes that allow for both mandatory indemnifica-
tion rights and elective indemnification rights.
108
  In order for a cor-
poration to indemnify a director or an officer, most corporate stat-
 
 103 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 124 Stat. 
at 1904.  
 104 See id. 
 105 Baker III et al., supra note 64. 
 106 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 243 (5th ed. 2009).   
 107 Id.; see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 
(2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §  722 (McKinney 2011).      
 108 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 106, at 243.  
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utes require that the losses result from good-faith conduct on behalf 
of the corporation and that the losses not result from a criminal con-
viction.
109
  The policy reasoning behind these statutory requirements 
is “to encourage capable people to serve as corporate employees, of-
ficers and directors by permitting corporations to shield them from 
liability for their official activities.”
110
  Indemnification rights also pro-
vide corporate officials with the ability to defend themselves against 
suits brought against them in their official capacity.
111
 
Executive officers who face liability under Section 954 may at-
tempt to have their losses indemnified by the corporation in order to 
be reimbursed for the compensation that they are required to return.  
This attempt, however, may not be successful.  A recent court deci-
sion, for instance, prevented the indemnification of executive officers 
who faced liability under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
112
  In 
Cohen v. Viray, the dispute focused on a settlement agreement in a 
shareholders’ derivative suit, which included provisions that released 
and indemnified the CEO and the CFO of the corporation against all 
liability under Section 304.
113
  The Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
the SEC objected to the approval of the settlement agreement based 
on the inclusion of those provisions.
114
  While the district court was 
considering whether to approve the settlement agreement, the SEC 
brought a separate action against the former CEO seeking the return 
of $186 million under Section 304.
115
  After the district court ap-
proved the settlement agreement, the DOJ, with consultation from 
the SEC, appealed the district court’s decision, arguing that the pro-
visions of the settlement agreement that released and indemnified 
the CEO and the CFO nullified the SEC’s ability to enforce Section 
304.
116
  Ultimately, the court held that the settlement agreement 
 
 109 Id.  
 110 In re Miller, 290 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2002).  “No corporation can be a suc-
cess unless led by competent and energetic officers and directors. Such individuals 
would be unwilling to serve if exposed to the broad range of potential liability and 
legal costs inherent in such service despite the most scrupulous regard for the inter-
ests of stockholders.”  Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. Co., No. 6936–VCG, 2012 WL 395826, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2012).  
 111 In re Miller, 290 F.3d at 267 (citing VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 87 
(Del. 1998)).   
 112 See Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 113 Id. at 190. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 192. 
 116 Id. at 194.  
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could not include provisions that release and indemnify the CEO and 
CFO for liability under Section 304.
117
  The court reasoned that these 
provisions would frustrate the power of the SEC to pursue the public 
interests in litigation and would “fly . . . in the face of Congress’s ef-
forts to make high ranking corporate officers of public companies di-
rectly responsible for their actions that have caused material non-
compliance with financial reporting requirements.”
118
  According to 
the court, if the settlement agreement was allowed to stand, the CEO 
and CFO would be able to pass their liability onto the corporation 
and “would suffer no penalty at all.”
119
 
Based on the Second Circuit’s decision in Cohen, a company may 
not be able to indemnify its executive officers for liability under Sec-
tion 954.
120
  Due to the similarities between Section 954 and Section 
304, the court’s reasoning would most likely apply to liability under 
Section 954 as well.  If executive officers could be indemnified for 
their losses under Section 954, this would nullify the provision and 
would frustrate the legislative intent behind the provision.  Indemni-
fication would allow executive officers to simply pass the liability onto 
their companies, effectively allowing executive officers to escape any 
penalty for their actions.  This would prevent Section 954 from serv-
ing the public interest and from ensuring “the integrity of the finan-
cial markets.”
121
  Allowing for indemnification of liability under Sec-
tion 954 would permit executive officers to escape responsibility for 
their actions and decisions, an outcome that courts are not likely to 
be comfortable with. 
B. Director and Officer Insurance 
Director and officer (D&O) liability insurance has become an 
important tool for large corporations.
122
  Almost all large companies 
 
 117 Id. at 195.  
 118 Cohen, 622 F.3d at 195.  “The SEC’s decision to pursue § 304 relief is not solely 
intended to reimburse a company; it also furthers important public purposes.  The § 
304 remedy is an enforcement mechanism that ensures the integrity of the financial 
markets.”  Id.  Based on similar reasoning, the Second Circuit has held that an un-
derwriter is not entitled to indemnification by an issuer for violations of federal secu-
rities laws because it would be against the public policy embodied by the federal se-
curities laws and would encourage flouting of federal securities laws.  Globus v. Law 
Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288. (2d Cir. 1969).   
 119 Cohen, 622 F.3d at 195.  
 120 See id. 
 121 Id.   
 122 Michael Sousa, Making Sense of the Bramble Filled Thicket: The “Insured vs. Insured” 
Exclusion in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 366 (2007).  Many 
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maintain D&O liability insurance as a way of protecting their direc-
tors and officers from liability stemming from actions that are con-
nected to their corporate positions.
123
  While every insurance policy is 
different, most policies have some standard provisions that define the 
terms of the policy and outline what is covered by the policy and what 
is not.
124
  Most standard D&O liability insurance policies include In-
surance Agreement A, also known as “A-Side Coverage,” which pro-
vides direct coverage for directors and officers for losses that result 
from actions taken against them for “wrongful acts” committed in 
their corporate capacity.
125
  This means that the insurance provider 
will cover the monetary award or settlement that the director or of-
ficer is obligated to pay.
126
  The “A-Side Coverage” applies when the 
corporation cannot or does not indemnify its directors and officers.
127
 
If courts disallow indemnification for the money owed under 
Section 954, then executive officers may attempt to have the loss cov-
ered by their companies’ D&O liability insurance.  The ability of the 
executive officers to have their losses covered by insurance will de-
pend largely on the insurance policy of the individual company.
128
  
But there are several arguments why the money owed under Section 
954 are not be recoverable under D&O insurance policy, at least in 
the policy’s most common form.  
There are three main reasons why such losses may not be cov-
ered. First, coverage under most D&O liability insurance policies is 
only be triggered by a claim involving a “wrongful act” committed by 
the insured executive officer.
129
  This “wrongful act” requirement will 
most likely not be met by a claim under Section 954, because the pro-
 
states’ corporation laws permit corporations to purchase director and officer insur-
ance.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §  726 
(McKinney 2011).  
 123 See Sousa, supra note 122, at 366 (“Presently, as many as ninety-five percent of 
Fortune 500 companies maintain directors and officers liability insurance.”).  
 124 See WILLIAM P. BILA & TIFFANY S. SALTZMAN-JONES, WALKER WILCOX MATOUSEK 
LLP,  D&O POLICY BASICS “WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW” 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.wwmlawyers.com/images/uploads/00004683.pdf. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. 
 127 Id.  
 128 Id.  
 129 Kevin LaCroix, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and D&O Insurance, THE D&O DIARY (June 14, 
2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/06/articles/d-o-insurance/sarbanesoxley-
act-clawbacks-and-do-insurance/. 
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vision does not require that there be a showing of “misconduct.”
130
  
Under Section 954, liability can occur based only on the filing of an 
accounting restatement due to material noncompliance with filing 
requirements under the securities laws.
131
  Based on the language of 
the provision, it does not seem that a clawback claim will most likely 
involve any “wrongful act” and, therefore, would most likely not trig-
ger coverage under most D&O insurance policies.   
The second reason why the award under Section 954 would not 
be covered by a company’s D&O liability insurance is that “liability in-
surers regularly refuse to cover restitutionary and disgorgement 
amounts.”
132
  For example, most insurers will not cover awards that re-
sult from insider trading actions taken under Section 11 of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 and Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.
133
  The insurers’ refusal to cover these liabilities is based on sev-
eral court rulings which hold that restitutionary and disgorgement 
amounts do not fall within the meaning of “loss” under companies’ 
D&O policies.
134
  In Level 3 Communications, Inc. v. Federal Insurance 
Co., the Seventh Circuit held that the settlement award from a securi-
ties fraud suit was not a “loss” under the D&O liability insurance poli-
cy.
135
  The court agreed with the insurance provider that “a ‘loss’ with-
in the meaning of an insurance contract does not include the 
restoration of an ill-gotten gain.”
136
  In Conseco, Inc. v. National Union 
Fire Insurance Co., the court stated that “[i]t is axiomatic that insur-
ance cannot be used to pay an insured for amounts an insured 
wrongfully acquires and is forced to return.”
137
  This reasoning may 
apply to monetary awards under Section 954 as well, since these 
awards can be classified as disgorgements of the executive officers’ 
compensation.  The incentive-based compensation that the executive 
officer is required to return to the company may be considered an 
“ill-gotten gain” because it was received based on inaccurate account-
 
 130 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4). 
 131 Id.  
 132 BILA & SALTZMAN-JONES, supra note 124, at 3. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. (citing Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 
2001); Conseco, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 49D130202CP000348, 2002 WL 
31961447 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Dec. 31, 2002); Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 
545 (Cal. 1992)).  
 135 Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 272 F.3d at 910. 
 136 Id.   
 137 Conseco, Inc., 2002 WL 31961447, at *6. 
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ing statements.
138
  Thus, the executive officer is being forced to return 
the compensation because he or she was erroneously awarded that 
money, even if there was an absence of “misconduct.”
139
  Since the 
compensation being disgorged under Section 954 can be considered 
an “ill-gotten gain,” courts could hold that it cannot be covered by 
D&O liability insurance policies.  Therefore, if courts follow the ra-
tionales on which they have relied for denying insurance reimburse-
ment for Section 307 claw backs, executive officers who face personal 
liability under Section 954 would similarly not be reimbursed by their 
company’s insurance providers. 
Finally, the third reason why the award under Section 954 would 
probably not be covered by D&O liability insurance is that most poli-
cies have conduct-based exclusions to coverage.
140
  Within these con-
duct-based exclusions, most policies exclude “coverage for any loss 
based on a claim for any ‘profit or advantage’ to which the insured is 
not legally entitled.”
141
  Courts that have interpreted the term “profit 
or advantage” have held that it is a broad term, which should apply to 
any benefit received by directors or officers.
142
 The relevant cases in-
volved various violations of federal and state law by directors and of-
ficers.143  In TIG Specialty Insurance Co. v. Pinkmonkey.com Inc., the Fifth 
Circuit stated that “a defendant is not legally entitled to an advantage 
or profit resulting from his violation of law if he could be required to 
return such profit.”
144
  Based on this interpretation of the “profit or 
advantage” exclusion, money owed under Section 954 would proba-
bly not be covered by D&O liability insurance policies because it is a 
profit to which the executive officer is not entitled.  The executive of-
ficer is not entitled to the compensation because he or she received it 
based on erroneous data and would not have been awarded that 
amount of money if the original accounting statement was accurate.  
Since the money owed under Section 954 could fall within the “profit 
or advantage” exclusion, courts could hold that insurance providers 
 
 138 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–203, § 954, 124 Stat 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4). 
 139 Id.  
 140 Bila & Saltzman-Jones, supra note 124, at 3. 
 141 LaCroix, supra note 129.  
 142 See TIG Specialty Ins. Co. v. Pinkmonkey.com Inc., 375 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 
2004); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’’n, No. 4:07-CV-1958, 2008 
WL 2405975, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
    143 See TIG Specialty Ins. Co., 375 F.3d at 368; Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2008 WL 
2405975, at *6.    
 144 TIG Specialty Ins. Co., 375 F.3d at 370.  
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do not need to reimburse the executive officers for the returned 
compensation.  When an executive officer is required to return a por-
tion of his or her compensation under Section 954, this portion of 
the compensation will likely fall within the exclusion because the ex-
ecutive officer is not legally entitled to that money.   
All three of these arguments why illustrate why D&O liability in-
surance may not cover the money that executive officers owe under 
Section 954. 
C. Personal Bankruptcy 
 One of the most common forms of bankruptcy is Chapter 7, 
which is also known as the United States Bankruptcy Code’s “liquida-
tion chapter” and is often referred to as “straight bankruptcy.”  When 
this procedure is undertaken, a third party liquidates the debtor’s as-
sets and distributes the proceeds to the debtor’s creditors.
145
  Under 
bankruptcy law, the debtor is allowed to discharge his or her old 
debts.
146
  Discharge means that he or she is no longer personally liable 
for his or her pre-bankruptcy debt.
147
  If a creditor is owed a debt, it 
only receives a pro rata share of the assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy 
estate, which is usually only cents on the dollar.
148
  The most im-
portant policy goal of Chapter 7 bankruptcy is allowing a “fresh start” 
to a debtor so that he or she has the opportunity to start anew unhin-
dered by the burden of preexisting debt.
149
  In Grogan v. Garner, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the central purpose of bank-
ruptcy is “to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors 
can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 
‘a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unham-
pered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’”
150
  
Despite of the “fresh start” policy goal of bankruptcy, there are sever-
al exceptions to dischargeability
151
 which are found in § 523 of the 
 
 145 Lucian Murley, Note, Closing a Bankruptcy Loop-Hole or Impairing a Debtor’s Fresh 
Start? Sarbanes-Oxley Creates a New Exception to Discharge, 92 KY. L.J. 317, 319 (2003). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id.  
 149 Keith N. Sambur, Note, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Effect on Section 523 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code: Are All Securities Laws Debts Really Nondischargeable?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 561, 563 (2003) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Local Loan 
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).  
 150 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286 (quoting Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244).  
 151 Id.  
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Bankruptcy Code.
152
  These exceptions usually involve some type of 
culpable conduct on the part of the debtor.
153
 
While it may seem extreme for executive officers to declare per-
sonal bankruptcy in order to discharge debt owed for Section 954 lia-
bility, this may be a possibility considering the amount of money that 
could be at stake.  For example, in Cohen, the SEC sought to disgorge 
$186 million from the executive officer under Section 304 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act.
154
  In another Section 304 matter, a former CEO 
agreed to return more than $400 million to his former company as 
part of a settlement agreement.
155
  In light of potential awards or set-
tlements of this size, there is a possibility that executive officers would 
declare bankruptcy if they cannot afford to reimburse their compa-
nies.  In order to prevent discharge of debt owed under Section 954, 
the debt would have to fall within one of the exceptions enumerated 
in § 523 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code because the general rule is that 
most debt is dischargeable.
156
  There are two exceptions within § 523 
that may apply when an executive officer is attempting to discharge 
debt owed under Section 954. 
The first possible exception is found in § 523(a)(19).
157
  This 
provision allows an exception from dischargeability if two conditions 
are met: first, the plaintiff must show that the debt was the result of a 
securities law violation or for fraud in connection to the purchase or 
sale of a security, and, second, the debt must be set forth in a judicial 
 
 152 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006). 
 153 Sambur, supra note 149, at 564. 
 154 Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 155 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 13.  
 156 Sambur, supra note 149, at 564. 
 157 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2006).  Under Section 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, there is an exception to dischargeability for debt that 
is for: the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as that term is 
defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), 
any of the State securities laws, or any regulation or order issued under 
such Federal or State securities laws; or common law fraud, deceit, or 
manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of any security; 
and results, before, on, or after the date on which the petition was 
filed, from any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in 
any Federal or State judicial or administrative proceeding; any settle-
ment agreement entered into by the debtor; or any court or adminis-
trative order for any damages, fine, penalty, citation, restitutionary 
payment, disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment 
owed by the debtor. 
Id. 
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or administrative order or settlement agreement.
158
  The Corporate 
and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 added this provision 
of § 523 to the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
159
  
In enacting this provision, Congress intended to make judgments and 
settlements arising from securities law violations to be non-
dischargeable.
160
  This was done to help defrauded investors recover 
their losses by closing a perceived “loophole” in bankruptcy law, 
which had allowed wrongdoers to discharge their debt from securities 
law violations.
161
 
Based on the language of this provision, debt owed under Sec-
tion 954 could fall within this exception and, therefore, could be 
non-dischargeable.  In order for it to fall within this exception, two 
requirements must be met, however.  First, courts would have to find 
noncompliance with Section 954 to constitute a violation of securities 
law.  This may be likely because Section 954 has been added to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as Section 10D.
162
  Therefore, there is 
a very strong argument that Section 954 falls within the definition of 
“securities law” required by § 523 because that definition includes the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
163
  Second, the debt owed under 
Section 954 would have to be memorialized in a judicial or adminis-
trative order or a settlement agreement.  This would most likely apply 
to actions that the SEC brings against executives and, if courts were to 
allow private causes of action,164 it would likely apply to actions against 
executives by either the company or shareholders. But it would prob-
ably not apply to internal actions within companies.  In addition, 
there would have to be a showing that the alleged violations actually 
occurred.  For example, a settlement agreement that does not con-
cede fault or liability on part of the debtor may not satisfy this re-
quirement.
165
  If these prerequisites are met and based on the legisla-
tive intent behind the exception in § 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy 
 
 158 In re Jafari, 401 B.R. 494, 496 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009). 
 159 Murley, supra note 145, at 318. 
 160 S. REP NO. 107-146, at 12 (2002).  
 161 Id. at 10.   
 162 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4). 
 163 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 523.27 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 
2009 ). 
 164 While this Comment has argued that private causes of action will most likely 
not be permitted under Section 954, there is still the possibility that a court will find 
that Section 954 provides individuals with the right to private causes of action.   
 165 See In re Tills, 419 B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009). 
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Code, it seems that debt owed under Section 954 would be non-
dischargeable.  An executive or former executive who is trying to dis-
charge Section 954 debt is attempting to take advantage of the exact 
“loophole” that Congress wanted to close by enacting § 523(a)(19).
166
  
If debt owed under Section 954 was dischargeable, it would frustrate 
the policy reasoning for Section 523(a)(19). 
The second possible exception is found in § 523(a)(4).
167
  Under 
§ 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, there is an exception to 
dischargeability for any debt that is “for fraud or defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.”
168
  Defalca-
tion while acting in a fiduciary capacity involves the misappropriation 
or failure to account for funds.
169
  The federal courts have reached 
different interpretations of what constitutes defalcation while acting 
in a fiduciary capacity because some disagree about the requisite level 
of intent that the fiduciary must have when committing the defalca-
tion for the exception to apply.
170
  One group of circuit courts has 
held that negligence or innocent mistake by the fiduciary is enough 
for the exception to apply.
171
  Another group of circuit courts has 
held that there needs to be something more than negligence or mis-
take on the part of the fiduciary, such as willful negligence or reck-
lessness.
172
  A third group of circuit courts has held that extreme reck-
lessness or conscious misbehavior by the fiduciary is required for the 
exception to apply.
173
 
Based on the circuit split over the meaning of defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity, it is difficult to determine whether or 
not debt owed under Section 954 would be non-dischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(4).  Depending on which interpretation a court adopts, debt 
incurred under Section 954 could fall within the § 523(a)(4) excep-
tion.  Under the view that only negligence or mistake is required, 
debt owed under Section 954 would most likely be non-
dischargeable.  Executive officers owe the same fiduciary duties to the 
 
 166 S. REP NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002).  
 167 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006). 
 168 Id. 
 169 In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 170 See generally Matthew W. Knox, Note, Persistent Confusion: The Circuit Split Over 
the Exception to Discharge for Defalcation Under 11 USC § 523(a)(4), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1078 (2008) (discussing the circuit split in detail). 
 171 Id. at 1086–87.  
 172 Id. at 1091.   
 173 Id. at 1099.    
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company and its shareholders as board members do, such as the duty 
of loyalty and the duty of care.
174
  Therefore, executive officers are 
acting within a fiduciary capacity.
175
  Material noncompliance with the 
financial reporting requirements under the securities laws that re-
quire a company to prepare an accounting restatement could be con-
sidered defalcation because it could be seen as a failure to account 
for funds.  Under this standard, it would not be necessary to show 
that the executive officers intentionally caused the material noncom-
pliance but only that they were negligent in discharging their duties 
to avoid such noncompliance.
176
  
Under the interpretations of the other groups of circuit courts, 
however, it may be harder to find that debt owed under Section 954 is 
non-dischargeable.  For a court to hold a debt dischargeable under 
the two alternative interpretations, it would have to find that the ex-
ecutive officer was not merely negligent but rather the officer was 
reckless, extremely reckless, or conscious in causing the noncompli-
ance.
177
  If these higher standards were applied, executive officers 
would be able to escape liability under Section 954 more easily 
through the process of personal bankruptcy. 
As between the two exceptions, it seems that the securities law 
exception is more suitable for debt owed under Section 954.  Based 
on the wording of the provision and the legislative intent in enacting 
it, a court is more likely to find that this provision applies to debt 
owed under Section 954.  It seems less likely that a court would find 
debt owed under Section 954 to fall under the fiduciary duty excep-
tion because of the differing interpretations of when the exception 
applies. 
V. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE 
LIABILITY UNDER THE CLAWBACK PROVISION 
Congress had two policy reasons in mind when it included the 
clawback provision in the Dodd-Frank Act.
178
  First, Congress wanted 
to deter executives from making high risk decisions that will have 
short term gains but will eventually hurt the stability and strength of 
 
 174 See Michael Follet, Note, Gantler v. Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure? A Look 
at the Current State of Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Advice for Potential Protection, 35 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 563, 575 (2010). 
 175 Id.  
 176 Knox, supra note 170, at 1086. 
 177 Id. at 1091.  
 178 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 136 (2010). 
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the company.
179
  This provision acts as a deterrent against this risky 
behavior by forcing executives to reimburse the company for com-
pensation that is erroneously received.
180
  Second, Congress wanted to 
promote fairness to shareholders because executives should not be 
allowed to keep compensation that is received erroneously when the 
company would otherwise use the money  for other purposes.
181
 
If executives are allowed to escape liability under Section 954 
through indemnification, D&O liability insurance, or personal bank-
ruptcy, the policy rationale behind the provision will be frustrated.  
Executives will not face personal liability for excess compensation 
owed under Section 954 and, therefore, will not be deterred from 
making high-risk decisions.  Instead, either the company or an insur-
ance provider will reimburse the executive, through indemnification 
or D&O liability insurance, respectively.  In the event that neither in-
demnification nor D&O insurance is applicable, executive officer 
could attempt to discharge the debt incurred under Section 954 in 
Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy proceedings.  Based on past case law 
and statutory interpretation, there are strong arguments against al-
lowing the use of these methods to escape liability under Section 954.  
When considering Section 954 liability, courts should follow these 
holdings and interpretations, in order to ensure the effectiveness of 
Section 954.  Also, the “fairness to shareholders” reasoning will not 
be served if executives avoid liability in any of these three ways.  Un-
der any of these circumstances, the company and its shareholders will 
suffer because the company will foot the bill of the executive officer 
and not be able to put the money to better use. 
Based on the large amount of money that may be at stake, it is 
highly likely that executive officers that are required to return com-
pensation under Section 954 will attempt to avoid repayment.
182
  As 
more and more companies adopt and implement clawback policies in 
anticipation of the proposal of rules pursuant to Section 954,
183
 there 
will likely be an increase in instances in which executives are required 
to return certain parts of their compensation.  With this increase, 
 
 179 Id. (citing THE INVESTOR’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 44).  
 180 Id.  
 181 Id. 
 182 See supra Part IV.  
 183 See Erik Krusch, Corporate Governance: Dodd-Frank’s Compensation Tremors, 
COMPLINET.COM (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.complinet.com/dodd-
frank/news/analysis/article/corporate-governance-dodd-franks-compensation-
tremors.html. 
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there will be more executives searching for methods to avoid the lia-
bility imposed by the clawback policies.  Recently, companies and ex-
ecutives have looked for ways to get around other recent reforms,
184
 
and Section 954 enforcement will likely be no different.  In order for 
the enforcement of Section 954 to be fully effective, courts should 
not allow executive officers to escape liability under Section 954 by 
employing these methods.
185
  Just as the courts’ interpretations of Sec-
tion 304 in Jenkins and Cohen allowed enforcement of that provision, 
courts should interpret Section 954 to provide for the full enforce-
ment of its mandates.
186
  Based on the similarities in both purpose 
and effect between Section 304 and Section 954, courts should apply 
the interpretations of Section 304 to the enforcement of Section 954.  
While these two sections are not identical, their similarities are signif-
icant enough to justify similar enforcement.  By applying the prior in-
terpretations of Section 304 to the enforcement of Section 954, 
courts will provide for the broadest possible application of the two 
sections and ensure their effectiveness going forward.  This will allow 
Section 954 to have the impact that Congress intended it to have. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the Great De-
pression, the federal government took action to help the economy 
recover and to help prevent a similar crisis in the future.  As part of 
the federal government’s response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Act, which made sweeping reforms to the regulation of the financial 
industry.  Included within the Dodd-Frank Act was Section 954, which 
 
 184 See Eric Dash, Stock-Hedging Lets Bankers Skirt Efforts to Overhaul Pay, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Feb. 5, 2011, 5:04 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/stock-hedging-lets-bankers-skirt-efforts-
to-overhaul-pay.  
 185  There have been critics of the executive compensation provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act who have questioned whether the provisions will actually be effective in 
preventing future financial crises.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Fed-
eral Corporate Governance Round II 25–35 (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research 
Paper No. 10–12, Sept. 7, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673575.  As part of what Pro-
fessor Bainbridge termed “Quack Federal Corporate Governance,” he criticizes Sec-
tion 954 as being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive because it reaches innocent 
executives but at the same time does not reach other individuals who may pose a risk 
to the stability of a company.  Id. at 27.  Also, the provision may have unintended 
consequences, such as companies increasing fixed-salary compensation and decreas-
ing incentive-based compensation.  Id.  
 186 See Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2010); SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. 
Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
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mandates that companies listed on the national securities exchanges 
develop and implement clawback policies.  These policies require ex-
ecutive officers to reimburse the company for incentive-based com-
pensation in certain situations.  The clawback provision of the Dodd-
Frank Act has a number of similarities to the clawback provision of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which makes the Sarbanes-Oxley provision 
instructive on how the Dodd-Frank provision may be implemented 
and enforced.  While there are still many open questions as to how 
the clawback policies will be implemented and enforced, the congres-
sional intent in enacting Section 954 is clear: to deter risky behavior 
by executive officers and to promote fairness to shareholders.  In or-
der for these policy goals to be met, executives should not be able to 
avoid responsibility for debt incurred under Section 954 through in-
demnification, D&O insurance, or personal bankruptcy.  Thus, courts 
should use the interpretations of Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
At as a guide for the implementation of Section 954.  These interpre-
tations would allow the courts to thoroughly enforce liability under 
Section 954 and would allow Section 954 to have the effect that Con-
gress intended.  
 
